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The Introduction of 
the TMPG Fails Charge 
for U.S. Treasury Securities
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
ecurities transactions commonly involve a variety of
 market conventions—widely accepted ways of doing 
business that persist through time even though not mandated 
by law or regulation. Commonplace examples include the 
quotation of prices for Treasury bonds in increments of 32nds 
(and fractions of a 32nd) of a percent of principal value (rather 
than in decimal increments) and the quotation of Treasury bills 
in terms of discount rates (rather than prices or yields).
In most cases, market conventions are useful or, at worst, 
innocuous. In some cases, however, a new use for an old 
instrument can render a convention in need of revision. One 
particularly notorious example was the convention—observed 
prior to 1982—of ignoring accrued interest on Treasury bonds 
sold on repurchase agreements (also known as repos, or RPs). 
The convention made sense as long as repos were used 
primarily to borrow money from creditworthy lenders that 
held the bonds simply to limit their exposure to credit risk. It 
made less sense when highly leveraged securities dealers began 
to use repos to borrow bonds to deliver on short sales. The 1982 
Drysdale episode illuminated the risks involved in ignoring 
accrued interest and prompted the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to orchestrate a change in the convention.1
1 Garbade (2006).
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• Prior to May 2009, market convention enabled 
a seller of Treasury securities to postpone—
without any explicit penalty and at an 
unchanged invoice price—its obligation 
to deliver the securities.
￿ The September 2008 insolvency of Lehman 
Brothers exposed a flaw in this convention, 
when a decline in short-term interest rates 
set the stage for an extraordinary volume 
of settlement fails that threatened to erode 
the perception of the market as being free 
of credit risk.
￿ In response, the Treasury Market Practices 
Group introduced a “dynamic fails charge” 
for Treasury securities in May 2009.
￿ The fails charge incentivizes timely settlement 
by providing that a buyer of Treasury securities 
can claim monetary compensation from a seller 
if the seller fails to deliver on a timely basis.
￿ The fails charge mitigated a key dysfunctionality 
in the market and illustrates the value of public 
and private sector cooperation in responding 
to altered market conditions.
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A market convention may also require revision following a 
change in the economic environment. This article discusses a 
recent example: the convention of postponing—without any 
explicit penalty and at an unchanged invoice price—a seller’s 
obligation to deliver Treasury securities if the seller fails to 
deliver the securities on a scheduled settlement date. As 
discussed in more detail below, as long as short-term interest 
rates were above about 3 percent, the time value of money 
usually sufficed to incentivize timely settlement of transactions 
in Treasury securities. However, when short-term rates fell to 
near zero following the insolvency of Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. in September 2008, the time value of money no 
longer provided adequate incentive and the Treasury market 
experienced an extraordinary volume of settlement fails. Both 
the breadth of the fails across a large number of securities and 
the persistence of the fails were unprecedented and threatened 
to erode the perception of the Treasury market as a market free 
of credit risk.2 In response, the Treasury Market Practices 
Group (TMPG)—a group of market professionals committed 
to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the U.S. Treasury 
market—worked over a period of six months to revise the 
market convention for settlement fails, developing a “dynamic 
fails charge” that, when short-term interest rates are below 
3 percent, produces an economic incentive to settle trades 
roughly equivalent to the incentive that exists when rates are at 
3 percent. Thus, the TMPG fails charge preserves a significant 
economic incentive for timely settlement even when interest 
rates are close to zero.
2 See, for example, Wrightson, Federal Reserve Data, October 17, 2008 (“The 
breakdown in the clearing mechanism for the Treasury market is beginning to 
emerge as a top-tier policy concern. The safe-haven status of Treasury 
securities is one of the few advantages the government market has left in a year 
in which net Treasury borrowing needs . . . are likely to exceed $1 trillion by a 
large margin. At some point, though, buyers will think twice about buying a 
‘safe-haven’ asset for peace of mind if they have doubts about their 
counterparty’s ability to deliver the security.”).
This article describes the introduction of the TMPG fails 
charge. The introduction of the fails charge is important for 
two reasons. First, it mitigated an important dysfunctionality 
in a market of critical significance both to the Federal Reserve 
in its execution of monetary policy and to the country as a 
whole. Second, it exemplified the value of cooperation between 
the public and private sectors in responding to altered market 
conditions in a flexible, timely, and innovative fashion.
Our study is divided into three parts. The first part (Sections 2-5)
describes settlement processes and settlement fails in the 
Treasury market, explains why sellers usually try to avoid fails, 
describes industry and Federal Reserve efforts to mitigate 
settlement fails prior to 2008, and briefly reviews three episodes 
of chronic fails in the Treasury market. The second part 
(Section 6) describes the tsunami of fails that followed 
Lehman’s insolvency. The balance of the study (Sections 7-10) 
explains the TMPG’s response. Section 11 concludes.
2. Settlements and Settlement Fails 
in U.S. Treasury Securities
A transaction in Treasury securities is said to “settle” when the 
seller delivers the securities to, and receives payment from, the 
buyer. The two most important settlement processes are 
bilateral settlement and multilateral net settlement. Before 
describing those processes, we explain how market participants 
establish and transfer ownership of Treasury securities.
2.1 Establishing and Transferring Ownership
of Treasury Securities
For more than three decades, investors have established 
ownership of Treasury securities through Federal Reserve 
book-entry securities accounts.3 Book-entry account holders 
that own Treasury securities can house their securities directly 
in their accounts and can transfer the securities to other book-
entry accounts by issuing appropriate instructions to the 
Federal Reserve.
Federal Reserve book-entry accounts are generally available 
only to depository institutions and certain other organizations, 
such as government-sponsored enterprises and foreign central 
banks. All other market participants establish ownership of 
Treasury securities through commercial book-entry accounts 
at depository institutions that act as custodians for their 
customers. Depository institutions that offer commercial 
3 See “Book-Entry Securities Account Maintenance and Transfer Services,” 
Federal Reserve Banks Operating Circular no. 7, August 19, 2005. Garbade 
(2004) describes the origins of the Federal Reserve book-entry system.
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Note: This transfer of bonds and funds is effected through the Federal 
Reserve if the seller and buyer have different custodians, and is effected 
on the books of the common custodian if they have the same custodian.
book-entry accounts hold their customers’ securities in their 
Federal Reserve book-entry accounts commingled with their 
own securities.
A market participant with a commercial book-entry 
account can transfer Treasury securities to another market 
participant through their respective custodians. For example, 
participant A can transfer a Treasury security to participant B 
by instructing its custodian to debit its commercial book-entry 
account and to transfer the security to B’s custodian for credit 
to B’s commercial book-entry account. Upon receipt of 
instructions, A’s custodian will debit A’s account and instruct 
the Federal Reserve to 1) debit its Federal Reserve book-entry 
account and 2) credit the Federal Reserve book-entry account 
of B’s custodian. Following receipt of the security in its Federal 
Reserve book-entry account, B’s custodian will complete the 
transfer by crediting B’s commercial book-entry account. 
(If A and B have a common custodian, the transfer can be 
completed on the books of that common custodian without 
involving the Federal Reserve.)
2.2 Bilateral Settlement
The simplest type of settlement occurs when a market 
participant has sold Treasury securities for bilateral settlement 
on a deliver-versus-payment basis. The sale may be a 
conventional sale of securities but it may alternatively be 
the starting leg, or the “off” leg, of a repurchase agreement. 
(We describe repurchase agreements in more detail below.)
Suppose, for example, an investor sells ten Treasury bonds 
at a price of $100 per bond for settlement on June 2. Following 
negotiation of the terms of the sale, the seller will instruct its 
custodian to send ten bonds to the buyer’s custodian on June 2 
against payment of $1,000. The buyer will concurrently 
instruct its custodian to receive, on June 2, ten bonds from the 
seller’s custodian and to pay $1,000 upon receipt of the bonds. 
On June 2, the seller’s custodian will instruct the Federal 
Reserve to 1) debit its Federal Reserve book-entry account for 
ten bonds, 2) credit the Federal Reserve book-entry account of 
the buyer’s custodian for ten bonds and simultaneously debit 
the account of the buyer’s custodian for the $1,000 due upon 
delivery, and 3) credit the seller’s custodian’s account for the 
$1,000. The resulting transfers of securities and funds are 
shown in Exhibit 1.4 
Following notification that ten bonds have come into its 
Federal Reserve book-entry account and that $1,000 has been 
withdrawn, the buyer’s custodian will verify that the bonds and 
money are consistent with the buyer’s instructions. In most 
cases, they are and the custodian will credit the buyer’s account 
for the ten bonds and debit that account for $1,000. In some 
cases, however, the buyer will have provided different 
instructions—perhaps referencing a different security or a 
different invoice price—or no instructions. In any of these 
cases, the buyer’s custodian will reverse the settlement, 
instructing the Federal Reserve to return the ten bonds and 
recover the $1,000 payment. The buyer and seller and their 
respective custodians will then have to communicate and come 
to a common understanding of the terms of the underlying 
transaction, following which the seller will reinitiate the 
settlement process.
2.3 Multilateral Net Settlement
Bilateral settlement is a simple process that satisfies the purpose 
of settlement: moving securities from sellers to buyers and 
moving funds from buyers to sellers. Alternative settlement 
structures, however, can sometimes be more efficient.
4 In the event the buyer and seller have a common custodian, settlement can be 
completed on the books of the common custodian, with cash and securities 
moving between the accounts of the respective customers, without involving 
the Federal Reserve.
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Consider, for example, the case where:
￿ participant A sells ten bonds to participant B at a price 
of $100 per bond for settlement on the following 
business day,
￿ B sells ten of the same bonds to participant C at a price 
of $99 per bond, also for settlement on the following 
business day, and
￿ C sells eight of the same bonds to A at a price of $101 per 
bond, again for settlement on the following business day.
As shown in Exhibit 2, bilateral settlement of the three 
transactions requires the delivery of twenty-eight bonds against 
payments of $2,798. 
As an alternative, the participants might agree to settle 
through a central counterparty (CCP). The CCP first marks all 
of the deliver and receive obligations to a common price—say, 
$100 per bond. After marking to the common price, 
￿ A is obligated to deliver ten bonds to B against payment 
of $1,000,
￿ B is obligated to deliver ten bonds to C against payment 
of $1,000, and
￿ C is obligated to deliver eight bonds to A against 
payment of $800.
Marking to a common price results in gains for some 
participants and losses for others. In the example, B gains 
because it will receive more for the bonds sold to C than the 
original contract price and C loses for the same reason. These 
gains and losses are exactly offset with further agreements to 
make small side payments of cash. In particular:
￿ A agrees to pay $8 to the CCP,
reflecting the $8 gain from marking the price of the eight 
bonds bought from C down from $101 per bond to $100 
per bond,
￿ B agrees to pay $10 to the CCP, 
reflecting the $10 gain from marking the price of the ten 
bonds sold to C up from $99 to $100 per bond, and
￿ the CCP agrees to pay $18 to C, 
in compensation for the $8 loss from marking the price 
of the eight bonds sold to A down from $101 per bond, 
and for the $10 loss from marking the price of the ten 
bonds bought from B up from $99 per bond.
On the night before the settlement date, the CCP nets out 
the deliver and receive obligations of A, B, and C and novates5 
their respective contracts, becoming the buyer from every net 
seller and the seller to every net buyer, all at the common 
settlement price. After netting and novation:
￿ A is obligated to deliver two bonds to the CCP against 
payment of $200,
￿ B has no deliver or receive obligations, and
￿ the CCP is obligated to deliver two bonds to C against 
payment of $200.
On settlement day, the obligations of A to deliver two bonds 
to the CCP and the CCP to deliver two bonds to C are settled 
with bilateral deliver-versus-payment settlements. In addition, 
A, B, and the CCP make the agreed-upon side payments of 
cash. Exhibit 3 shows that multilateral net settlement requires 
the delivery of four bonds and payments of $436—about 
15 percent of the deliveries and payments shown in Exhibit 2.
2.4 Some Concrete Identities
The foregoing description of settlement processes referred to 
abstract entities like “participant A” and an unnamed “central 
counterparty.” Before we begin to discuss settlement fails, it 
may be helpful to identify some of the key participants in the 
Treasury market.
At the center of the market is a group of dealers that provide 
liquidity to customers, quoting bid prices at which they are 
willing to buy and offer prices at which they are prepared to 
sell. A subset of dealers, called “primary dealers,” make markets 
5 To novate is to substitute one legal obligation for another.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 49
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Note: Security settlements are shown with solid blue and black lines. Side 





to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York when the Bank is 
conducting open market operations on behalf of the Federal 
Reserve System.6 Box 1 identifies the primary dealers as of mid-
2008. 
Dealers sometimes trade directly with each other, but more 
commonly through specialized interdealer brokers. A dealer 
that sells securities to another dealer through an interdealer 
broker agrees to deliver securities (against payment) to the 
broker. The broker, in turn, agrees to deliver the same 
securities (also against payment) to the ultimate buyer. This 
arrangement allows the dealers to trade on a “blind,” or 
undisclosed, basis.
All of the dealers, and all of the interdealer brokers, 
maintain commercial book-entry accounts at one of two banks: 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and The Bank of New York 
Mellon. These two “clearing” banks offer custodial services 
refined over many years to meet the needs of brokers and 
dealers that deliver and receive large volumes of securities on a 
daily basis. 
The Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), a 
subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, is 
the central counterparty in the Treasury market. All of the 
6 See, generally, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Administration of 
Relationships with Primary Dealers,” January 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_ policies.html. 
primary dealers and all of the interdealer brokers, as well as a 
number of other market participants, are netting members of 
FICC. FICC maintains commercial book-entry accounts at 
both JPMorgan Chase and The Bank of New York Mellon and 
is prepared to receive securities from, and deliver securities to, 
any of its netting members in a timely and efficient fashion.
Beyond the dealers, the interdealer brokers, and FICC, 
the Treasury market consists of a large number of other partici-
pants, including “real-money” investors such as mutual funds, 
pension funds, and corporate treasurers, and “leveraged 
accounts” such as hedge funds. Some of these participants trade 
directly with dealers, others trade anonymously in electronic 
markets. All use custodians that offer more or less complex 
(and more or less costly) services tailored to their needs.
Box 1
Primary Dealers in Mid-2008a
Banc of America Securities LLC
Barclays Capital Inc.
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.b
BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co.
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Daiwa Securities America Inc.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
J. P. Morgan Securities Inc.
Lehman Brothers Inc.c
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.d
Mizuho Securities USA Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated
UBS Securities LLC
a Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealers List,” July 15, 2008, 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/
an080715.html.
b Removed October 1, 2008, following its acquisition by J. P. Morgan 
Securities Inc.
c Removed September 22, 2008.
d Removed February 11, 2009, following its acquisition by Bank of America 
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2.5 Settlement Fails
A settlement fail occurs when the obligation of a seller to 
deliver securities to a buyer remains outstanding following the 
close of business on the scheduled settlement date of a 
transaction. This can occur either because the seller’s custodian 
failed to tender any securities to the buyer’s custodian, or 
because the buyer’s custodian rejected whatever securities were 
tendered by the seller’s custodian. In the event of a settlement 
fail in Treasury securities, the market convention is to 
postpone settlement to the following business day without any 
change in the funds due upon delivery and (prior to May 2009) 
without any explicit penalty or charge.7 The process of failing 
(to settle) and deferring settlement to the next business day can 
take place repeatedly, day after day, until settlement occurs or 
the trade is canceled.
Settlement fails can occur for any of several reasons. First, a 
fail can result from miscommunication. A buyer and seller may 
not have a common understanding of the terms of a trade, or 
one or the other may have failed to communicate settlement 
instructions to its custodian, or may have communicated 
incorrect instructions, or one of the custodians may have 
misunderstood the instructions that it received. In any of these 
cases, the buyer’s custodian will reject whatever securities are 
tendered by the seller’s custodian. After becoming aware of the 
failed attempt to settle (or of the absence of any attempt to 
settle), the buyer and seller and their respective custodians 
communicate to resolve the problem. This usually results in 
successful settlement within a day or two.
A fail may also stem from operational problems. One 
well-known instance occurred on Thursday, November 21, 
1985, when a computer outage at The Bank of New York 
7 This convention was memorialized in Chapter 8, Section C, of the 
Government Securities Manual of the Public Securities Association: “If 
securities are not delivered on the agreed upon settlement date, there is a fail. 
Regardless of the date the securities were actually delivered, the buyer of the 
securities pays the seller the original settlement date figures.” The Public 
Securities Association was the forerunner of the Bond Market Association, 
which joined with the Securities Industry Association in 2006 to form the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.
(a predecessor of The Bank of New York Mellon) prevented 
that bank from effecting deliveries of Treasury securities. The 
bank was unable to resolve the problem until the following day, 
and had to finance overnight (at its own expense) the customer 
securities that it was unable to deliver. It borrowed in excess of 
$20 billion from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
incurred interest expenses of $5 million.8
A settlement fail can also occur because the seller does not 
have the requisite securities in its commercial book-entry 
account. This is the most common reason for failing when fails 
are chronic, but it is usually avoided at other times by 
borrowing securities and delivering the borrowed securities.
3.  Repurchase Agreements and 
Borrowing Securities to Avoid 
or Cure Settlement Fails
A repurchase agreement is a sale of securities coupled with an 
agreement to repurchase the same securities at a specified price 
on a later date.9 Market participants use repos to borrow 
money when they buy securities but do not have sufficient cash 
on hand to pay for them, that is, to finance long positions, as 
well as to borrow securities when they sell securities they do not 
already own, that is, to finance short positions. 
A repo is analogous to a loan, where the proceeds of the 
initial sale correspond to the principal amount of the loan and 
the excess of the repurchase price over the original sale price 
corresponds to the interest paid on the loan. A market 
participant might, for example, sell securities for $10 million 
and simultaneously agree to repurchase the securities ten 
days later for $10,008,333. This is analogous to borrowing 
$10 million for ten days at an interest rate of 3 percent per 
annum.10 Market participants commonly think of repos as 
loans, rather than as purchases and sales, and quote repos in 
terms of interest rates rather than in terms of sale and 
repurchase prices.11
8 A Computer Snafu Snarls the Handling of Treasury Issues,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 25, 1985, p. 58; Committee on Banking, Finance, and 
Urban Affairs (1985); “Fed is Queried on Failure of Bank Computer System,” 
Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1985, p. 49; “Fed Weighs a Penalty,” 
New York Times, December 13, 1985, p. D2; Sender (1986).
9 Repurchase agreements are complex financial instruments whose contracting 
conventions have evolved over the past four decades. See Garbade (2006) and 
Fleming and Garbade (2003, 2004).
10 $8,333 = (repo term of 10 days / 360 days in a year) × 3 percent per annum 
× $10 million, where the calculation uses the money market convention of a 
360-day year.
11 The quotation convention does not change the nature of a repo—
a transaction in which one party sells securities subject to an agreement 
to repurchase them at a later date.
A settlement fail occurs when the 
obligation of a seller to deliver securities 
to a buyer remains outstanding following 
the close of business on the scheduled 
settlement date of a transaction.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 51
Exhibit 4
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Repos are most commonly arranged on an overnight basis 
but can run for days or weeks. They can also be arranged on an 
“open,” or continuing, basis (with a daily adjustment of the 
interest rate) at the mutual consent of the parties. Industry 
standard documentation for a repo provides that if the original 
seller fails to repurchase the securities on the agreed-upon 
repurchase date, the original buyer has the contractual right to, 
among other things, sell the securities to a third party and use 
the proceeds to satisfy the original seller’s repurchase 
obligation. Conversely, if the original buyer does not deliver 
the securities back to the original seller on the repurchase date, 
the original seller has the contractual right to, among other 
things, use the funds that it otherwise would have used to 
repurchase the securities to “buy in,” or replace, the securities.
3.1 Types of Repurchase Agreements
Repos come in two flavors: general collateral repos (used to 
borrow money) and special collateral repos (used to borrow 
securities).
General collateral repos: A general collateral repo is a repo in 
which the lender of funds is willing to accept any member of a 
stated class of securities as collateral. Any of a variety of 
securities is acceptable because the lender is concerned 
primarily with earning interest on its money and having 
possession of liquid assets that can be sold quickly in the event 
of a default by the borrower. 
Interest rates on overnight general collateral repos are 
usually quite close to rates on overnight loans in the federal 
funds market. This reflects the essential character of a general 
collateral repo as a device for borrowing and lending money. 
Repo rates for the most liquid and creditworthy collateral, 
Treasury securities, are lowest. Repo rates for other classes of 
collateral, such as fixed-income securities issued by a federal 
agency or mortgage-backed securities issued by a government 
sponsored enterprise, are somewhat higher.
Special collateral repos: A special collateral repo is a repo in 
which the lender of funds designates a particular security as the 
only acceptable collateral.12 Treasury market participants 
commonly lend money on special collateral repos in order to 
borrow specific securities that they need.
The interest rate on a special collateral repo is called a 
“specials rate.” The owner of a Treasury security that other 
market participants want to borrow may be incentivized to 
lend the security if that owner is offered an opportunity to 
borrow money at a specials rate less than the Treasury general 
collateral repo rate. For example, if the rate on a special 
collateral repo involving bond B is 2 percent and the general 
collateral repo rate is 3 percent, an investor who owns bond B 
can earn a 100 basis point spread by lending the bond and 
borrowing money on a special collateral repo and then 
relending the money on a general collateral repo (Exhibit 4). 
The difference between the general collateral repo rate for 
Treasury securities and the special collateral repo rate for a 
particular Treasury security is a measure of the “specialness” of 
the security and is commonly called the security’s “specialness 
spread.” We show below that a security’s specialness spread is 
exactly the opportunity cost of borrowing the security to avoid 
or cure a settlement fail.
12 See Duffie (1996), Keane (1996), Jordan and Jordan (1997), Fisher (2002), 
and Fleming and Garbade (2002).
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3.2 Incentives, prior to May 2009, 
to Borrow Securities to Avoid 
or Cure a Settlement Fail 
Prior to May 2009, sellers of Treasury securities, including 
short sellers, borrowed securities to avoid or cure settlement 
fails primarily because they did not get paid until they delivered 
the securities that they had sold. Prior to May 2009, market 
participants usually quantified the cost to a seller of a 
settlement fail in Treasury securities as the overnight Treasury 
general collateral repo rate—the rate the seller could have 
earned on a riskless overnight investment of the sale proceeds 
that it did not receive. (It should be noted, however, that even 
prior to May 2009, the cost of a settlement fail was not limited 
to foregone interest earnings. Settlement fails also expose 
market participants to the risk of counterparty insolvency and 
can lead to increased capital charges for some participants. 
These other costs are discussed in Box 2.)
A seller who does not have the securities needed to settle a sale 
can avoid failing by borrowing (on a special collateral repo) the 
securities that it needs. However, borrowing securities is not 
costless because the borrower has to lend money (on the special 
collateral repo) at a rate lower than the general collateral repo 
rate that it could have earned on the money. The cost of 
borrowing securities to avoid a fail in Treasury securities may be 
quantified as the difference between the overnight Treasury 
general collateral repo rate (the rate the borrower could have 
earned on its money) and the overnight special collateral repo 
rate on the borrowed securities (the rate the borrower actually 
earns on its money)—that is, the securities’ specialness spread.
Prior to May 2009, a seller had an incentive to avoid failing 
to deliver a security (by borrowing the security on a special 
collateral repo and delivering the borrowed security) as long as 
the cost of borrowing the security was less than the cost of 
failing. This was certainly the case if the specialness spread for 
the security was less than the general collateral repo rate or, 
equivalently, if the special collateral repo rate for the security 
was greater than zero.13 As long as a seller could earn more than
a de minimis amount of interest on a special collateral repo, it 
made economic sense to lend the money, earn the interest, 
and avoid the fail.
13 Using economic terminology, let   denote the general collateral 
repo rate and   denote the special collateral repo rate for the security. 
The specialness spread   will be less then   if and only if   
is greater than zero.
Rgc
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Box 2
Other Costs of Settlement Fails
Settlement fails impose risks on both buyers and sellers and can 
lead to increased capital charges for some market participants.
A buyer who fails to receive securities faces the risk that the 
seller might become insolvent before the transaction is settled and 
that, to replace the securities, it will have to pay more than the price 
negotiated with the insolvent seller. Conversely, a seller who fails 
to deliver securities faces the risk that the buyer might become 
insolvent before the transaction is settled and that the seller will 
then have to sell its securities to someone else at a price lower than 
the price negotiated with the insolvent buyer. These risks may be 
small for fails that are no more than a day or two old (because 
securities prices usually do not change much from day to day), but 
they can become significant when fails persist for weeks or months.
In view of the greater risks faced by both buyers and sellers 
during the life of a long-outstanding, or “aged,” fail, some market 
participants are required to absorb incremental capital charges 
when a settlement fail has been outstanding for more than a few 
weeks.a Such capital charges can drain capital from more 
rewarding activities and limit balance sheet capacity, thereby 
imposing opportunity costs on market participants—and if 
sufficiently widespread and chronic can threaten overall market 
functioning.b
a See, for example, the net capital rule of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 17, Section 15c3-1.
b See, for example, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Treasury Borrowing 
Advisory Committee of the Bond Market Association, November 4, 2003,” 
November 5, 2003, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
js933.htm (“While the situation is much improved since this past summer, 
members commented that fails were still at an elevated level which does 
hurt general market liquidity because dealers are forced to reduce their 
market making activities as the fails take up space on their balance sheets.”). 
One Treasury official suggested that opportunity costs resulting from 
higher capital charges might not be all bad. See “Remarks by Jeff Huther, 
Director of the Office of Debt Management, to the Bond Market 
Association’s Annual Meeting,” April 22, 2004, available at http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1455.htm (noting that “capital charges 
resulting from chronic—widespread and persistent—fails soak up dealer 
capital that might otherwise be used to support profit-making activities, 
thereby focusing management attention on the underlying fails problem 
and incentivizing managers to remedy the situation.”).
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3.3 Equilibrium in the Market 
for Special Collateral Repos
The market for borrowing and lending a particular Treasury 
security comes into equilibrium as a result of fluctuations in 
the special collateral repo rate for the security relative to the 
Treasury general collateral repo rate. If the demand to borrow 
the security is modest relative to the supply available for 
lending, a market participant seeking to borrow the security 
will usually be able to lend its money at a specials rate no lower 
than about 15 to 25 basis points below the general collateral 
repo rate. However, if the demand to borrow the security 
expands, some borrowers (in order to avoid failing) will be 
willing to accept less interest on the money they lend. 
Downward pressure on the specials rate for the security relative 
to the general collateral repo rate makes lending the security 
more remunerative, thereby attracting additional lenders. It 
may also ration some borrowers out of the market, particularly 
short sellers who decide to liquidate their short positions rather 
than continue to finance those positions on special collateral 
repos earning lower rates of interest. The collateral market will 
return to equilibrium, that is, to a state where the quantity of 
the security sought to be borrowed at the prevailing specials 
rate equals the quantity of the security available for lending at 
that rate, when the lower specials rate has attracted enough new 
lenders and/or rationed enough borrowers out of the market. 
4. Federal Reserve and Industry 
Efforts to Mitigate Settlement Fails
Treasury market participants have an interest in mitigating 
settlement fails in order to limit their net interest expenses as 
well as their exposure to the risk of counterparty insolvency—
a risk explained in Box 2. The Federal Reserve has a separate 
interest in mitigating settlement fails to maintain the liquidity 
and efficiency of the market in which it conducts open market 
operations. (A high volume of fails can lead market partici-
pants to reduce, or even withdraw from, their normal activities. 
Such activities include dealers making markets for customers, 
investors lending securities to dealers to facilitate settlement of 
dealer sales, and arbitrageurs seeking to exploit, and thereby 
eliminate, price relationships that present abnormal profit 
opportunities.)
Since 1969, the Federal Reserve has sought to mitigate 
settlement fails by lending Treasury securities to primary 
dealers to facilitate settlement of dealer sales.14 (However, the 
Federal Reserve lends against collateral, rather than cash, to 
insulate the supply of reserves available to the banking system 
from securities lending operations.) Pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the lending program in effect in mid-2008,15 each 
business day at noon the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
offered to lend on an overnight basis up to 90 percent of the 
amount of each Treasury security beneficially owned in the 
Federal Reserve’s System Open Market Account (SOMA), 
subject to an upper limit of the amount of an issue actually in 
the account.16 Primary dealers bid for a security by specifying 
the quantity desired (in increments of $1 million) and the 
overnight loan fee they were willing to pay, expressed as a rate 
per annum, subject to a minimum fee of 50 basis points.17 
Bidding closed at 12:15 p.m. and loans were awarded to the 
highest bidders at their bid rates18 until all of the securities 
available for lending were allocated or all of the bidders 
had been satisfied.19 During the first six months of 2008, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York lent an average of 
$12.2 billion of securities per day, distributed over an average 
of twenty-three different issues, at an average loan fee of 
61 basis points per annum.
14 In authorizing the loan of Treasury securities from the System Open Market 
Account in 1969, the Federal Open Market Committee stated that the action 
“was taken after the Manager [of the System Open Market Account] had 
advised that the problem of delivery failures in the Government securities 
market had worsened significantly over the past year, partly because private 
facilities for lending such securities had become inadequate; that delivery 
failures were markedly impairing the performance of the market; and that the 
functioning of the market would be improved if securities held in the System 
Open Market Account could be lent, for the express purpose of avoiding delivery 
failures, to Government securities dealers doing business with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York . . . .” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1970, p. 32).
15 “SOMA Securities Lending Program Terms and Conditions (Revised),” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August 22, 2008, available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevetns/news/ markets/2008/an082208.html. 
Details of the history of the Fed’s lending program appear in Fleming and 
Garbade (2007).
16 In order to avoid failing itself, the Fed does not agree to lend securities unless 
it has actual possession of the securities at the time of an auction. Thus, it will 
not agree to lend securities that it lent the preceding business day and that have 
not yet been returned.
17 A loan fee for a security is approximately equivalent to the security’s 
specialness spread. See Fleming and Garbade (2007). The minimum fee avoids 
crowding out private lenders when security loan markets are functioning 
normally, but it has been reduced to nearly zero when those markets are not 
functioning well. 
18 The auction for each security is a discriminating, or multiple-price, auction.
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Treasury market participants have also acted cooperatively 
to mitigate settlement fails and otherwise reduce the cost of 
settling transactions. Between 1986 and 1988, dealers in 
Treasury securities organized the Government Securities 
Clearing Corporation (GSCC) to serve as a central counter-
party in interdealer transactions in Treasury and related 
securities. As explained earlier, multilateral net settlement 
through a central counterparty economizes on the quantity of 
securities that have to be delivered to settle a given volume of 
transactions. GSCC also implemented a trade confirmation 
protocol that essentially eliminated interdealer fails due to 
miscommunication between dealers, as well as a procedure for 
marking failed trades to current market prices that materially 
reduced the consequences of counterparty insolvency. The 
GSCC extended its net settlement system to include Treasury 
auction takedowns in 1994 and repurchase agreements in 
1995.20 In 2002, GSCC became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation and was renamed 
the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation.
5.  Chronic Settlement Fails
Demand to borrow a security (relative to the supply available for 
lending) can sometimes be large enough to drive the specials rate 
for the security down to near zero. Prior to May 2009, sellers 
would then become largely indifferent between a) failing and 
b) borrowing the security to avoid failing. In this extreme case, 
any unsatisfied demand to borrow would spill over into fails. 
Fails could expand further if security lenders, observing a 
growing incidence of settlement fails, declined to continue 
lending out of concern that their securities may not be returned 
on a timely basis.21 Fails could expand still further if, as explained 
in Box 3, market participants concluded that they could acquire 
a cheap option on a future increase in a specials rate by 
contracting to sell a security in a special collateral repo and then 
strategically failing to deliver the security. More generally, 
settlement fails could become chronic when the specials rate for 
a security was driven down to near zero. 
Three episodes of chronic fails have been described in the 
literature: in May and June of 1986,22 following the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,23 
and during the summer of 2003.24
19 Awards were subject to three limitations: 1) no dealer could have 
outstanding borrowings of more than 25 percent of the amount of an issue 
beneficially owned in the System Open Market Account, 2) no dealer could 
have outstanding borrowings of more than $750 million of any single issue, and 
3) no dealer could have outstanding borrowings of more than $3 billion of 
securities in total.
20 See Garbade and Ingber (2005) and Ingber (2006).
21 This can quickly lead to a self-reinforcing and destabilizing cycle, with 
lenders withdrawing collateral out of a concern that borrowers may fail to 
return the securities, thereby increasing the incidence of settlement fails 
and triggering further collateral withdrawals.
22 Cornell and Shapiro (1989). Cornell and Shapiro do not discuss fails directly, 
but do document a near-zero specials rate for the 9 1/4 percent Treasury bond 
of February 2016 and discuss the reasons for that low rate. The existence of 
widespread settlement fails in the issue was common knowledge among market 
participants at the time.
23 Fleming and Garbade (2002).
24 Fleming and Garbade (2004). See also Fleming and Garbade (2005).
Box 3
Strategic Fails 
When the specials rate for a security is close to zero in a market 
without a fails charge convention, a market participant with no 
position in the security may sometimes agree to lend the security 
on a term repurchase agreement and then fail, intentionally, on 
the starting leg of the repo.
Suppose, for example, the three-week specials rate for a five-
year note is 10 basis points and that XYZ Co. believes the specials 
rate will be 50 basis points in one week. If XYZ contracts (in the 
specials market) to borrow $50 million for three weeks against 
lending the note, it will owe interest of $2,917 at the end of three 
weeks.a It will owe this amount even if it fails to deliver the note any 
time during the three-week interval.
XYZ Co. has effectively purchased (for $2,917, payable in three 
weeks) an option on an exchange of $50 million for the five-year 
note at any time during the next three weeks for the balance of the 
three-week interval.
XYZ could choose to let its option expire unexercised and simply 
pay the $2,917 premium at the end of three weeks. However, if XYZ 
Co.’s expectations prove correct, it can exercise the option after one 
week by borrowing the five-year note for two weeks against lending 
$50 million at 50 basis points (earning interest of $9,722b) and 
delivering the note in (delayed) settlement of its earlier negotiated 
three-week repurchase agreement. The $50 million received from 
delivering the note funds the loan that allows XYZ Co. to borrow the 
note, and XYZ Co. has net interest earnings of $6,805 ($6,805 = 
$9,722 interest income, less $2,917 interest expense). 
More generally, a very low specials rate presents an opportunity 
to speculate on an increase in the rate—by lending on, and then 
failing on, a special collateral repurchase agreement—with limited 
downside exposure.c In the limit, a repo rate of zero may be viewed 
by some participants as a “risk-free” opportunity to intentionally 
fail and either profit or break even. Such practices can lead to an 
increase in aggregate settlement fails and the associated indirect 
costs discussed in Box 2.
a $2,917 = (21/360)   0.10 percent per annum   $50 million.
b $9,722 = (14/360)   0.50 percent per annum   $50 million.
c Strategic fails are noted in Fleming and Garbade (2002, p. 47), Fleming 
and Garbade (2004, pp. 3-4), and in “Remarks by Jeff Huther, Director of 
the Office of Debt Management to the Bond Market Association’s Annual 
Meeting,” April 22, 2004, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
js1455.htm.
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5.1 The 1986 Episode
An “on-the-run” Treasury security is the most recently 
auctioned security in a given series, such as the most recently 
auctioned six-month bill or ten-year note. In late April 1986, 
dealers began to sell the on-the-run thirty-year Treasury bond 
(the 9 1/4 percent bond of February 2016) short in anticipation 
of bidding for the new thirty-year bond that would be 
announced on April 30 and auctioned on May 8 for settlement 
on May 15.25 Such short selling in advance of an auction 
announcement was normal and customary dealer behavior.26 
However, dealers soon found themselves unable to borrow 
enough 9 1/4 percent bonds to finance their short positions, in 
part because a significant quantity of the bonds was owned by 
investors who declined to lend.27 Strong dealer demand and 
limited supply combined to drive the special collateral repo 
rate for the bonds down to about 5 basis points, and dealers 
began to fail on their settlement obligations. Failing, however, 
was expensive because the Treasury general collateral repo rate 
was about 6.75 percent, so dealers with short positions had an 
economic incentive to cure their fails another way: by buying 
(rather than borrowing) the 9 1/4 percent Treasury bonds and 
delivering the purchased bonds—thereby closing out their 
short positions. They bid up the price of the 9 1/4 percent 
bonds, relative to the prices of other Treasury bonds with 
similar maturities, until the higher price induced holders to sell 
the 9 1/4 percent bonds and replace them with higher yielding 
substitutes, thereby allowing dealers to cover their short 
positions.28
25 Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1992, p. B-1, footnote 1) 
(“participants sold the outstanding 9 1/4 percent bond . . . to prepare for the 
roll into the WI [“when-issued”] thirty-year bond.”). Following the announce-
ment of the forthcoming auction, dealers planned to buy the on-the-run thirty-
year bond (thereby covering their previous short sales of that bond) against 
selling the WI thirty-year bond short. The transactions would leave them with 
short positions in the WI bond that they could cover in the auction. 
26 Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1992, p. 10, footnote 11) 
(“dealers . . . sold [the 9 1/4 percent bond] short as part of a trading strategy 
that had worked in the past as they prepared to bid for a new thirty-year 
bond.”). The sequence of shorting the on-the-run thirty-year, rolling the short 
into the WI thirty-year, and then bidding to buy the WI thirty-year in the 
auction was part of the process whereby dealers distributed new bonds to 
market participants.
27 Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1992, p. 10, footnote 11; 
p. B-1, footnote 1) (“some institutional investors did not make the 
[9 1/4 percent bonds] available to the repo market” and “securities needed
to [finance] short positions were not readily available to the repo market.”).
28 Cornell and Shapiro (1989, pp. 303-4) suggest that the 9 1/4 percent bond 
of February 2016 was overvalued by as much as 7 percent of principal value 
compared with one close substitute (the 9 7/8 percent bond of November 
2015).
5.2 The 2001 Episode
The 2001 fails episode was attributable, in the first instance, to 
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001. The attack destroyed the offices of several interdealer 
brokers and impaired telecommunication services throughout 
lower Manhattan. GSCC recorded $266 billion in interdealer 
settlement fails on September 11 and $440 billion in interdealer 
fails on September 12.29 Sellers tried to borrow the securities 
needed to cure their fails but holders realized that, in view of 
the severe operational problems, their securities might not be 
returned on a timely basis and they consequently declined to 
lend.30 The contraction in the supply of collateral pushed 
specials rates to near zero and settlement fails remained 
elevated. Daily average fails in Treasury securities reported by 
primary dealers to the Federal Reserve31 reached $200 billion 
per day during the week of September 13-19 and continued 
high through early October. Settlement fails were particularly 
high for the on-the-run five-year note (the 4 5/8 percent note 
29 Fleming and Garbade (2002, p. 46).
30 See “After Attack, Settlement Woes Still Clogging Repo Market,” Dow Jones 
Newswires, September 26, 2001, 9:05 (noting “a general reluctance among large 
portfolios to lend their securities” and “in a chain reaction, the fear of failing 
trades is ‘causing portfolio managers, securities lending desks and foreign 
central banks to hold even tighter on to their collateral,’ which is exacerbating 
the situation . . . .”); “Treasury Market is Faced with Incomplete Trades,” Wall 
Street Journal, October 3, 2001, p. C10 (“Because of the rate of fails . . . dealers 
are reluctant to use their securities as collateral. They are worried that they 
might not have securities delivered to them . . . . ”); “U.S. Sells $6 Billion in 10-
Year Notes to Help Overcome Shortage,” Bloomberg News, October 4, 2001, 
13:16 (quoting Peter Fisher, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic 
Finance, as saying that “the cause of the fails is [in part] the result of . . .  
reluctance by institutional investors to lend into a market that is suffering from 
extraordinarily high fails levels.”); and “U.S. Acts on Shortage of Treasuries,” 
New York Times, October 5, 2001, p. C1 (“With the prospect that securities 
might not be returned, both dealers and large investors have become unwilling 
to lend them in the repo market.”).
31 Fleming and Garbade (2005) describe the settlement fails data reported by 
primary dealers to the Federal Reserve. Unless otherwise noted, this article 
measures settlement fails as the daily average over weekly intervals of the 
average of cumulative primary dealer fails to receive Treasury securities during 
a week and primary dealer fails to deliver Treasury securities over the same 
week. The Federal Reserve does not publish data on settlement fails on a day-
by-day basis.
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of May 2006) and the on-the-run ten-year note (the 5 percent 
note of August 2011).
Settlement fails began to shrink to more normal levels after 
the Treasury reopened the on-the-run ten-year note in an 
extraordinary unscheduled auction offering on Thursday, 
October 4, and after officials indicated that they might reopen 
the on-the-run five-year note as well.32 Peter Fisher, the Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance, stated that the 
Treasury reopened the ten-year note “to reduce the risk that . . . 
settlement problems turn into a much bigger problem for the 
Treasury market . . . .”33 Fisher went on to observe that “we 
have something that is self-compounding. There is some point 
at which your fails pile up, and that is the point at which you 
damage the price-discovery process and the smooth operating 
of the Treasury market.” 
The actions of Treasury officials convinced market 
participants that the Treasury would take unprecedented steps 
to facilitate settlements and maintain market liquidity. Holders 
of the on-the-run five- and ten-year notes began to make the 
notes available, and the level of fails subsided.34
5.3 The 2003 Episode
The 2003 fails episode was attributable, in the first instance, to 
a heavy volume of short sales of the on-the-run ten-year note 
(the 3 5/8 percent note of May 2013) in late June 2003 by 
market participants seeking to hedge their interest rate risk on 
long positions in other fixed-income securities.35 The short 
sales created an unusually large demand to borrow the note 
that drove the specials rate for the note down to zero, after 
which the residual, unsatisfied demand spilled over into fails. 
The fails became chronic when investors began to withdraw 
from lending the note. Daily average fails in Treasury securities 
reported by primary dealers to the Federal Reserve went from 
32 “U.S. Sells $6 Billion in 10-Year Notes to Help Overcome Shortage,” 
Bloomberg News, October 4, 2001, 13:16, and “U.S. Acts on Shortage of 
Treasuries,” New York Times, October 5, 2001, p. C1 (both quoting the Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance as saying that the Treasury 
might reopen the five-year note in the next week). 
33 “U.S. Acts on Shortage of Treasuries,” New York Times, October 5, 2001, 
p. C1.
34 See, for example, “Remedial Reopenings and the Treasury Supply Outlook,” 
Money Market Observer, October 8, 2001 (“Dealers reported a dramatic 
reduction in the volume of fails on [October 5] after the settlement of the 
additional $6 billion of ten-year notes . . . .”), and “Another Emergency 
Treasurys Sale Looks Unlikely as Shortages that Hamstrung ‘Repo Market’ 
Ease,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2001, p. C17.
35 “Supply Dries Up Following Fall in Prices,” Financial Times, August 23, 
2003, p. 27 (reporting that “Demand for Treasuries from some quarters has 
also risen as prices have fallen because many institutions want to borrow the 
securities and ‘short’ them in the expectation that prices will continue to drop. 
Traders say hedged positions for the [on-the-run ten-year note] now exceed 
the amount of Treasury securities available.”).
$25 billion per day during the week ending June 18 to 
$103 billion per day during the week ending July 2, and topped 
out at $232 billion per day during the week ending August 20. 
Settlement fails persisted for months36 and were not fully 
resolved until the end of the year, following an offering of a new 
series of ten-year notes in November.37
5.4 Proposals to Mitigate Chronic 
Settlement Fails
The 2003 episode had a strong impact on the thinking of 
market participants. Unlike the 1986 episode, which was short-
lived and quickly forgotten, and unlike the 2001 episode, which 
clearly stemmed from unusual circumstances, the 2003 episode 
was lengthy, large-scale, and stemmed from a marketplace 
activity—hedging—that was a very ordinary occurrence. The 
2003 episode raised the question of whether something should 
be done, by government officials or by private sector market 
participants, to mitigate chronic fails.
The key difference between the 1986 and 2003 episodes 
was the level of the Treasury general collateral repo rate. 
In May 1986, the overnight general collateral repo rate was 
about 6.75 percent. That made it costly to continue to fail 
even after the special collateral repo rate on the 9 1/4 percent 
bonds of February 2016 had been driven down to near zero 
and the economic incentive to avoid failing by borrowing 
the bonds had been eliminated. The high cost of failing 
incentivized short sellers to cover their short positions with 
outright purchases, and they bid up the price of the 9 1/4 per-
cent bonds to a level that gave holders an economic incentive 
to swap out of the issue and into higher yielding substitutes.
In mid-2003, however, the overnight Treasury general 
collateral repo rate was about 1 percent, so the cost of failing 
was modest. Short sellers had little incentive to cover their 
36 See, for example, “Treasury Issue Remains a Headache,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 17, 2003, p. C13.
37 “California Standoff Dims Prospects,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 
2003, p. C17 (reporting “progress for the . . . May ten-year note, which traders 
said appeared to be emerging from six months of gridlock, thanks to supply 
that entered the market last week. The note was trading in positive territory in 
the repurchase-agreement market. For months, it had been stuck at 0% . . . .”).
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short positions with outright purchases after demand to 
borrow the May 2013 ten-year note had driven the specials rate 
on the note down to near zero and eliminated the incentive to 
borrow the note to avoid failing. 
Market participants and government officials learned from 
the 2003 episode that settlement fails were liable to become 
chronic quickly when short-term interest rates are low,38 and 
they began to contemplate institutional innovations to avoid, 
or at least mitigate, chronic settlement fails. Most discussions 
centered around three possibilities:
￿ a regular program to reopen an issue when settlement 
fails in the issue become chronic,
￿ a securities lending facility run by the Treasury 
Department, and
￿ a fee to be paid by failing sellers to their counterparties 
to incentivize the sellers to resolve their fails. 
Reopenings: Reopening an issue to alleviate chronic fails was 
exactly what the Treasury did when it reopened the on-the-run 
ten-year note on October 4, 2001.39 However, Treasury 
officials were reluctant to institutionalize reopenings as a 
device to mitigate chronic fails. Three months after the 2001 
reopening, Under Secretary Fisher told market participants 
that while “it would be imprudent of me to say that the 
Treasury will never again hold such an auction . . . you should 
not count on it, you should not expect it . . . .”40 The problem 
was that reopenings in response to chronic fails ran counter 
to “regular and predictable” issuance, a cornerstone of 
Treasury debt management since the 1970s.41 Treasury officials 
were concerned that the uncertainties engendered by an 
38 See, for example, “Remarks by Jeff Huther, Director of the Office of 
Debt Management, to the Bond Market Association’s Annual Meeting,” 
Department of the Treasury, April 22, 2004, available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/js1455.htm (“The heart of the pricing problem last year was, 
unquestionably, the low federal funds rate and the consequently low ceiling on 
the cost of financing a short position.”); Department of the Treasury (2006, 
p. 26, p. 174, footnote 2) (“The potential for chronic fails episodes thus 
increases in a very low interest rate environment such as that prevailing during 
the summer of 2003.”); and “Statement of Under Secretary for Domestic 
Finance Randal K. Quarles to Bond Market Association Annual Meeting,” 
Department of the Treasury, May 19, 2006, available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/js4274.htm (“When the central bank wishes to establish very low 
short-term rates, the maximum degree of specialness will be quite small. 
During these periods, we might expect to see greater incidence of fails episodes 
because the cost of failing is low.”).
39 That reopening was not the first time the Treasury increased the supply of a 
security in response to unusual market conditions. On November 3, 1992, the 
Treasury announced that it would reopen the 6 3/8 percent note of August 
2002, at that time the on-the-run ten-year note, “in order to alleviate an acute, 
protracted shortage” of the note. See “Treasury November Quarterly 
Financing,” Office of Financing, Department of the Treasury, November 3, 
1992.
40 “Remarks by Peter R. Fisher, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic 
Finance, Before the Bond Market Association Legal and Compliance 
Conference,” January 8, 2002, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
po.906.htm.
unpredictable reopening program would raise borrowing costs 
over the long run.42
A Treasury lending facility: Like reopenings, a Treasury 
lending facility would involve additional issuance from the 
Treasury. Unlike reopenings, a Treasury lending facility would 
increase supply on only a temporary basis. Such a facility was 
put forth as a “straw man” in a Treasury white paper published 
in May 2006.43 The white paper was written to stimulate public 
discussion of mechanisms to make available “an additional, 
temporary supply of Treasury securities on rare occasions 
when market shortages threaten to impair the functioning of 
the market for Treasury securities and broader financial 
markets . . .”
However, Treasury officials questioned whether the 
Secretary of the Treasury has statutory authority to issue 
securities on a temporary basis to alleviate chronic settlement 
fails. Federal law provides that “the Secretary of the Treasury 
may borrow on the credit of the United States Government 
amounts necessary for expenditures authorized by law and may 
issue bonds of the Government for the amounts borrowed.”44 
Similar provisions authorize the issuance of notes and bills.45 
The 2006 Treasury white paper suggested that “the Treasury 
would likely need to pursue new authority to issue securities 
for the purpose of securities lending. . . .”46
41 Garbade (2007) describes the emergence of “regular and predictable” as a 
Treasury debt management strategy.
42 See “Remarks of Undersecretary of the Treasury Peter R. Fisher to the 
Futures Industry Association, Boca Raton, Florida,” March 14, 2002, available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1098.htm.
43 Department of the Treasury (2006). The public responses to the white paper 
are available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-
management/slf-comments.pdf. See also Garbade and Kambhu (2005). 
A Treasury lending facility was also recommended by the Treasury Borrowing 
Advisory Committee following the chronic fails of late September and early 
October 2001; see “Report to the Secretary of the Treasury from the Treasury 
Advisory Committee of the Bond Market Association,” October 30, 2001, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-
management/adv-com/reports/rpt-2001-q4.pdf (“members overwhelmingly 
felt that Treasury should expand their ability to enhance liquidity in the 
Treasury market. To accomplish this, they could set up a repo facility to help 
alleviate protracted shortages, in particular, large and persistent fails . . . .”).
44 31 U.S.C. § 3102 (2010).
45 See 31 U.S.C. § 3103-3104 (2010).
46 Department of the Treasury (2006, pp. 26, 178).
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A fails charge: In 2002, two economists at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York suggested that “chronic fails can also be 
alleviated by increasing the cost of failing with a penalty fee.”47 
The economists noted that such a fee would give sellers an 
economic incentive to borrow securities to avoid failing even 
when the special collateral repo rate for the securities was close to 
zero. They further noted that a fails charge might lead market 
participants to borrow securities against lending money at 
negative specials rates (in order to avoid the fails charge) and that 
such negative specials rates could attract additional securities 
lenders (because they would receive, rather than pay, interest on 
the money they borrowed against lending securities).
The economists suggested that a fails charge might be set at 
some threshold rate minus the general collateral repo rate, with 
a minimum of zero.48 The fails charge would be above zero 
only if the general collateral repo rate was below the threshold 
rate and would not be higher than what was necessary to bring 
the total cost of failing to the threshold rate. (For example, if 
the threshold rate is 5 percent and the general collateral repo 
rate is 3 percent, the fails charge would be 2 percent and the 
total cost of failing would be 5 percent.) They further suggested 
that the fails charge could be instituted through a “good-
practice” recommendation of the Bond Market Association.49 
The economists noted that a fails charge could be implemented 
implicitly by reducing the invoice price on a transaction each 
day the seller fails—a material departure from the existing 
convention of deferring settlement at an unchanged invoice 
price—but observed that “the operational burden of changing 
an invoice price following a delay in settlement would 
undoubtedly be substantial.”50
5.5 Inaction prior to the Insolvency 
of Lehman
Following the 2003 episode of chronic settlement fails, both 
government officials and private sector market participants 
understood that chronic fails are prone to blossom in an 
environment of low interest rates. Several parties had identified 
ways to address the problem, but each of the suggestions had a 
material deficiency. Treasury officials asked private sector 
participants to address the problem, but nothing substantive 
came of their requests.51 No significant progress was made with
47 Fleming and Garbade (2002, p. 52).
48 Fleming and Garbade (2002, p. 53).
49 The Bond Market Association joined with the Securities Industry 
Association in 2006 to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association.
50 Fleming and Garbade (2002, p. 52).
respect to addressing the problem of chronic fails before the 
insolvency of Lehman in the fall of 2008.
6.  Chronic Settlement Fails in the 
Wake of the Insolvency of Lehman
The announcement, early in the morning of Monday, 
September 15, 2008, that Lehman was insolvent triggered a 
“flight to safety” that, by the close of trading that day, pushed 
the yield on four-week Treasury bills down to 36 basis points, 
100 basis points lower than the yield on the preceding Friday. 
Yields on longer term bills also moved sharply lower. By the 
close of trading on Wednesday, September 17, yields on four-
week bills were down to 7 basis points. Over the balance of the 
month, four-week-bill yields fluctuated between about 10 basis 
points and 100 basis points—well below the 1.50 to 1.85 percent 
range that had prevailed since the beginning of August (Chart 1).
Greater demand for high-quality, short-term debt also 
drove down repo rates on Treasury collateral. The overnight 
Treasury general collateral repo rate averaged 90 basis points 
between September 15 and September 30, well below the 2 per-
cent level that had prevailed during the preceding six weeks 
(Chart 2). 
In the wake of Lehman’s insolvency and in the midst of the 
ensuing flight to safety, investors became increasingly reluctant 
to lend Treasury securities.52 Unable to replace their maturing 
borrowings, dealers began to fail on their delivery obligations. 
51 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee,” 
November 4, 2008, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
hp1239.htm (stating that “Since November 2003, Treasury has repeatedly 
asked the private sector to address [the fails] issue proactively. On several 
occasions, market participants have emphatically stated that they would 
resolve the situation without government intervention, but such steps have not 
been implemented.”). See also Wrightson, Federal Reserve Data, October 17, 
2008 (stating that “the repo market has managed to fend off regulatory reform 
in past cycles.”), and “The Treasury Market Reaches Breaking Point,” 
Euromoney, December 1, 2008 (quoting a former Treasury employee as saying 
that “It was politically difficult to convince the market to put a stop to fails to 
deliver in treasuries. There were some forceful voices insisting that if the 
Treasury got involved, they would take the incentives out of the specials market 
altogether. Those making their living as specialist dealers, as well as those 
making a living shorting securities outright, were worried about potential 
supply changes which would eliminate trading opportunities for them.”).
The first response to the rising tide of 
settlement fails was the decision of the 
Federal Reserve to relax the terms of 
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The fails persisted because the low general collateral repo rate 
left sellers with little incentive to cure the fails. Primary dealer 
settlement fails in Treasury securities mushroomed to an 
average of $253 billion per day during the week of Thursday, 
September 18, to Wednesday, September 24—far in excess of 
the level that had prevailed in August and the first half of 
September (Chart 3). And unlike earlier episodes, fails in the 
wake of Lehman’s insolvency were not concentrated in one or 
two issues; rather, they involved securities across the entire 
yield curve.
The first response to the rising tide of settlement fails was 
the decision of the Federal Reserve to relax the terms of its 
securities lending program. As shown in Table 1, on Tuesday, 
September 23, the Fed raised the limit on total borrowings by a 
single dealer from $3 billion to $4 billion. Loans to primary 
dealers from the SOMA portfolio reached new heights but 
primary dealer settlement fails continued to rise, averaging 
$342 billion per day over the interval from September 25 to 
October 8 (Chart 3). 
On Wednesday, October 8, both the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury acted in response to the continuing crisis. The Federal 
Reserve further eased the terms of its securities lending 
program by reducing the minimum loan fee from 50 basis 
52 “Demand for Short-Term Treasury Debt Puts a Crimp in World-Wide 
Supply,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2008, p. C1 (reporting that “some 
foreign central-bank officials … are reluctant to lend out their safest 
collateral—U.S. Treasurys.”); “U.S. Treasury Steps Up Debt Sales to Reduce 
Shortages (Update 2),” Bloomberg.com, October 8, 2008, 12:43 EDT (quoting 
the head of interest rate strategy at Credit Suisse Securities as saying that 
“people are so nervous about the financial crisis that they’re holding on to their 
collateral and not lending it out.”); and “More Treasury Bonds on Way to Ease 
Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2008, p. A6 (reporting that “investors 
have been unwilling to lend Treasury securities to other market participants.”).
points to 10 basis points and by expanding the limit on total 
borrowings by a single dealer to $5 billion (Table 1). Treasury 
officials took the unprecedented step of reopening four off-the-
run Treasury notes, announcing at 10:40 a.m. that they would 
“reopen multiple securities which have created severe 
dislocations in the market causing acute, protracted 
shortages.”53 Two of the reopened notes were auctioned later 
the same day (at 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., respectively), and 
the other two notes were auctioned the following day (Table 2). 
The decision to reopen a substantial amount ($10 billion each) 
of so many different notes made clear the scale of the fails 
problem; the decision to auction one note with less than an 
hour of notice and a second note with less than three hours of 
notice emphasized the urgency of the situation. 
Although the reopenings helped to mitigate settlement fails 
in the issues that were reopened, aggregate primary dealer 
Treasury fails continued to rise, reaching a daily average level of 
$379 billion per day over the interval from October 9 to 
October 22 (Chart 3). Comments to the effect that “Treasury 
market functioning remains impaired” and “the repo market is 
not functioning” became commonplace. On October 17, a 
widely read market letter remarked that “the breakdown in the 
clearing mechanism for the Treasury market is beginning to 
emerge as a top-tier policy concern.”54
53 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Statement on Treasury Market 
Conditions and Debt Management Actions,” October 8, 2008, available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases//hp1186.htm. 
54 Wrightson, Federal Reserve Data, October 17, 2008.60 The Introduction of the TMPG Fails Charge
Chart 3
Daily Average (Over Weekly Intervals) Primary Dealer Settlement Fails in Treasury Securities
August to October 2008
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: The first square marks the Lehman insolvency on Monday, September 15. The second square marks the effective date of a revision in the 
terms and conditions of the Federal Reserve System Open Market Account (SOMA) securities lending program on Tuesday, September 23. 
The third square marks the announcement of the surprise reopening of four Treasury notes on Wednesday, October 8, and the effective date 
of a further revision in the terms and conditions of the SOMA securities lending program on the same day.
Denotes business days













Terms and Conditions of Federal Reserve Security Loan Auctions
Limits on Outstanding Borrowings 
by a Single Dealer
Effective Date
Theoretical Amount 
of a Single Issue Offered 
(Percentage of SOMA Holdings)a
Minimum Loan Fee 
(Basis Points) Per Issue Total
Terms and conditions prior 
   to Lehman insolvency
   November 26, 2007 90 50 Lesser of $750 million and 25 percent 
of amount beneficially owned in 
SOMA portfolio
$3 billion
Post-Lehman terms and conditions
   September 23, 2008 90 50 Lesser of $750 million and 25 percent 
of amount beneficially owned in 
SOMA portfolio
$4 billion
   October 8, 2008 90 10 Lesser of $750 million and 25 percent 
of amount beneficially owned in 
SOMA portfolio
$5 billion
   December 18, 2008b 90 1 Lesser of $750 million and 25 percent 
of amount beneficially owned in 
SOMA portfolio
$5 billion
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: SOMA is the Federal Reserve System Open Market Account. Entries in bold indicate a change in terms.
a Amount actually offered is the lesser of the theoretical amount offered and the amount of the issue actually in the SOMA account at the time of an auction.
b Last revision prior to the end of 2008.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 61
7.  The TMPG Steps Up
By mid-October 2008, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials 
and private sector market participants understood that the 
volume and persistence of settlement fails in Treasury 
securities was a major problem, but what could or should be 
done was far from obvious. The four reopenings had reduced 
fails in the reopened notes, but speculation over whether the 
Treasury would reopen other chronically failing issues was 
contributing to unwanted volatility in the prices of other 
Treasury securities. Additionally, there was some indication 
that the reopenings had not been well received. The first 
auction, of $10 billion of the 4 1/8 percent notes of May 2015, 
attracted only $12.1 billion of tenders, and the notes were sold 
at a price almost 3 points below where outstanding notes of the 
same series traded prior to the auction.
An alternative approach was to revise the market 
convention of postponing—without any explicit penalty and at 
an unchanged invoice price—a seller’s obligation to deliver 
Treasury securities if the seller failed to deliver the securities on 
a scheduled settlement date. However, precisely because the 
treatment of settlement fails was a matter of market 
convention, rather than law or regulation, it could not be 
changed except through widespread adoption of an alternative 
convention. 
Fortuitously, in early 2007 the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York had sponsored the organization of a new forum—
the Treasury Market Practices Group—for discussing Treasury 
market practices and for advocating the adoption of practices 
deemed to be in the best interests of the market.55 
The TMPG is a group of private sector market professionals 
committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the 
market for U.S. Treasury securities. Membership includes 
senior business managers and legal and compliance 
professionals from broker-dealer firms, banks, buy-side firms, 
and other organizations involved in Treasury market 
infrastructure. (Box 4 identifies the membership in October 
2008.) The TMPG routinely meets about eight to ten times a 
year to discuss trading issues and best-practice recommenda-
tions for the Treasury market and publishes “Treasury Market 
Best Practices,”  56 a “living document” that aims to support 
55 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Statement on Formation of Private-
Sector Treasury Market Best Practices Group,” February 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2007/an070209.html. 
See also Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Statement Regarding New York 
Fed Meeting with Primary Dealers,” November 6, 2006, available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevetns/news-archive/markets/2006/an061105.html. 
56 Available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/TMPG-best-
practices_033109.pdf. 
Table 2 
Treasury Notes Reopened in October 2008
4 1/8 Percent Note Maturing 
May 15, 2015
4 1/4 Percent Note Maturing 
August 15, 2015
4 Percent Note Maturing 
February 15, 2015
3 1/2 Percent Note Maturing 
February 15, 2018
Amount offered $10 billion $10 billion $10 billion $10 billion
Auction date and time October 8, 2008, 11:30 a.m. October 8, 2008, 1:00 p.m. October 9, 2008, 11:30 a.m. October 9, 2008, 11:30 a.m.
Issue date October 15, 2008 October 15, 2008 October 15, 2008 October 15, 2008
Amount bid competitively $12.1 billion $21.1 billion $23.7 billion $23.1 billion
Closing market yield on
   October 7, 2008 (percent) 2.87  2.98  2.79 3.57
Auction yield (percent) 3.31 3.44 3.23 3.79 
Closing market yield on
   October 9, 2008 (percent) 3.35 3.57 3.22 3.92
Sources: U.S. Treasury Department; Wall Street Journal.
Note: Over the interval from October 7 to October 9, the closing market yield on the on-the-run five-year note (the 3 1/8 percent note of September 30, 
2013) rose from 2.47 percent to 2.79 percent and the closing market yield on the on-the-run ten-year note (the 4 percent note of August 2018) rose 
from 3.50 percent to 3.81 percent. 
The TMPG is a group of private sector 
market professionals committed to 
supporting the integrity and efficiency of 
the market for U.S. Treasury securities. 62 The Introduction of the TMPG Fails Charge
Treasury market integrity and efficiency. Best-practice 
recommendations include guidelines for promoting market 
liquidity, for integrating compliance and trading functions in a 
meaningful fashion, and for managing large positions in ways 
that avoid adverse consequences for market liquidity. TMPG 
practice guidance has also addressed the efficient clearing and 
settlement of trades. Thus, the TMPG was well positioned in 
October 2008 to provide the leadership required to revise the 
market convention for settlement fails.57
The first meeting of the TMPG after the reopening auctions 
of October 8 and 9 was on Thursday, October 23. The 
chairman, Tom Wipf of Morgan Stanley, opened the meeting 
by reminding members of the urgency of the situation:
To overstate the obvious, the work of today’s meeting 
around settlement fails in Treasuries finds our committee 
57 The Association of Primary Dealers provided similar leadership in revising 
the market convention for the treatment of accrued interest in repurchase 
agreements after the 1982 failure of Drysdale Government Securities 
(Garbade 2006).
at a crossroad. . . . At this critical juncture it is incumbent 
that TMPG take the leadership position on this issue 
and work as a group to provide practical, real time 
solutions. . . . Our goal as members of this committee 
is to support the integrity and efficiency of the U.S. 
Government Treasury Market. . . . 
William Dudley, Executive Vice President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and Manager of the Fed’s System 
Open Market Account, echoed Wipf’s call for leadership: “This 
[meeting] is happening at a critical time in the market place 
where leadership is important to creating confidence and 
stability—we believe this group can, should and will provide 
that leadership.”
7.1 The November 12 Recommendations
During the October 23 meeting, and in a series of subsequent 
telephone conference calls, TMPG members discussed changes 
in market practices that might reduce chronic fails and limit 
the likelihood of a recurrence. The group unveiled its 
recommendations on Wednesday, November 12, 2008.58 
The principal recommendation suggested that “market 
participants agree that the invoice price . . . on any cash or 
financing transaction that fails to settle on the originally 
scheduled date be reduced at a fails [charge] rate equal to the 
greater of a) 3 percent per annum minus the fed funds target 
rate … and b) zero.” As shown in Chart 4, this would penalize 
fails at a rate that starts at zero when the target federal funds 
rate is at or above 3 percent and rises to 3 percent as the target 
funds rate declines toward zero. It follows that the economic 
cost of failing would never fall below about 3 percent per 
annum.59 The TMPG concluded that the “out-of-pocket cost 
to the party failing to deliver securities will provide a 
compelling incentive to resolve fails promptly.” 
58 Treasury Market Practices Group, “Treasury Market Practices Group 
Endorses Several Measures to Address Widespread Settlement Fails,” 
November 12, 2008, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/
PR081112.pdf. The recommendations were reported in “Treasury’s Warning 
Adds to Plunge in Failed Trades,” Bloomberg.com, November 12, 2008, 
15:59 EST, and “Repo Experts Propose Plans to Counteract Rise in ‘Fails,’” 
FT.com, November 12, 2008, 20:00.
59 This follows because the sum of the target federal funds rate, which is usually 
at or slightly above the Treasury general collateral repo rate, and the fails charge 
rate would never be less than 3 percent. The TMPG could have referenced the 
overnight Treasury general collateral repo rate in lieu of the target federal funds 
rate, but the target funds rate is more familiar and more readily observable to 
market participants. There is no definitive and widely disseminated measure of 
overnight Treasury general collateral repo rates. The Federal Reserve, by 
comparison, publicly announces the target funds rate.
Box 4
Membership of the Treasury Market Practices Group 
in October 2008
Subsequent Additions prior to May 1, 2009
Thomas Wipf, Chair Morgan Stanley
Fran Bermanzohn Goldman Sachs (last meeting 
    in October 2008)
Arthur Certosimo The Bank of New York Mellon
Daniel Dufresne Citadel Investment Group, LLC
Peter Economou State Street
John Fath BTG
Michael Haddad Caxton Associates (last meeting 
    in January 2009)
Curt Hollingsworth Fidelity Investments
James Hraska Barclays Capital
Murray Pozmanter Depository Trust & Clearing
    Corporation
Gerald Pucci BlackRock
John Roberts Barclays Capital
Bill Santangelo Countrywide Securities Corp. 
    (last meeting in October 2008)
Peter Stebbing Reserve Bank of Australia
Nancy Sullivan The Bank of New York Mellon
Matthew Zames JPMorgan Chase
Glenn Hadden Goldman Sachs
Stuart Wexler Merrill LynchFRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 63
Target federal funds rate (percent per annum)
Chart 4
TMPG Fails Charge Rate as a Function 
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The TMPG explicitly based its recommendation on the 
dysfunctionality of the existing market convention for 
settlement fails:
Past experience—for example, during the summer 
of 2003—shows that settlement fails in a particular 
[security] may become widespread and persistent when 
the special collateral repo rate for that [security] nears 
zero. Special collateral repo rates cannot exceed the 
Treasury general collateral repo rate. As a result, 
settlement fails across a wide variety of [securities] 
can . . . become widespread and persistent when the 
Treasury general collateral repo rate is near zero—
as is currently the case.
       The underlying problem is the Treasury market 
contracting convention that a seller can deliver securities 
after the originally scheduled settlement date at an 
unchanged invoice price [and] without incurring any 
penalty. Introduction of a dynamic fails [charge] with a 
finite cap rate would remedy this problem. In particular, 
a dynamic fails [charge] would provide an incentive for 
sellers to resolve fails promptly, and could lead to repo 
contracting conventions [that is, negative repo rates] that 
would give beneficial owners of Treasury securities an 
opportunity to earn as much as the [3 percent] cap rate in 
securities loan fee income regardless of the level of 
nominal interest rates.60
60 Treasury Market Practices Group, “Treasury Market Practices Group 
Endorses Several Measures to Address Widespread Settlement Fails,” 
November 12, 2008.
The TMPG recognized that the “the introduction of [the 
recommended convention] raises operational, legal and other 
implementation issues that may vary across Treasury market 
participants” and promised to engage in “further analysis of 
these issues,” with a goal of announcing by January 5, 2009, 
its recommendations for implementation.61
8.  The Crisis Recedes but Support 
for Revising the Market 
Convention Persists
By the time the TMPG made its November 12 recommendation, 
settlement fails in the Treasury market were receding rapidly. 
As shown in Chart 5, primary dealer fails declined from a daily 
average of $379 billion during the week of October 16-22 to a 
daily average of $70 billion during the week of November 13-19 
and averaged less than $50 billion a day in December.
Support for a revised market convention for settlement 
fails persisted in spite of the receding volume of fails, largely 
because the crisis of late September and early October had 
given added currency to the view that the existing convention 
was dysfunctional. The discussion of settlement fails during 
the November 4, 2008, meeting of the Treasury Borrowing 
Advisory Committee, as well as the views expressed in a 
prominent market newsletter in early January 2009, illustrates 
the growing consensus.62
61 The TMPG made three additional recommendations on November 12: 
1) that market participants undertake a study of the most efficient way to 
margin fails in Treasury securities (in order to reduce counterparty credit risk 
exposure), 2) that market participants examine whether the Fixed Income 
Clearing Corporation, the two clearing banks, or other interested parties might 
develop “new or enhanced … multilateral netting arrangements” that might 
reduce settlement fails, and 3) that market participants pursue consensual cash 
settlement of transactions in Treasury securities that have been failing for more 
than five days. The TMPG also expressed its support for “discussion of a 
standing facility by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide temporary 
new supply of specific securities at a penalty rate when settlement fails persist,” 
but noted that the creation of such a facility was a long-term goal and that 
progress on a fails charge should not be contingent on the development of 
a Treasury security lending facility.
62 William Dudley, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, and Manager of the System Open Market Account, stated during a public 
conference call on January 14, 2009, on the TMPG fails initiative that: 
“Although settlement fails have declined recently from record levels amid 
reduced trading volumes, the extremely low level of interest rates suggests 
that fails could again rise significantly when trading activity picks up. The 
fundamental incentive to deliver securities under current market conditions 
is simply not sufficient at very low nominal interest rates to reduce the 


































































































































































































































































































Daily Average (Over Weekly Intervals) Primary Dealer Settlement Fails in Treasury Securities
September 2008 to April 2009
Billions of dollars
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
2008 2009
8.1 The November Meeting of the Treasury
Borrowing Advisory Committee
The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) is a 
committee of market professionals selected to advise the 
Secretary of the Treasury on matters relating to Treasury debt 
management. At its November 4 meeting, the committee 
discussed the upcoming midquarter refunding and, inter alia, 
the fails situation. 
The TBAC’s discussion of settlement fails focused initially 
on better ways for the Treasury to reopen outstanding issues 
than the “snap” reopenings of October 8 and 9, but then turned 
to the market convention for settlement fails. Several 
committee members observed that investors had “little 
economic incentive to lend securities when general collateral 
[repo] rates stood at 20 basis points,” and one member 
suggested that “a negative [repo] rate of 200 or 300 basis points 
. . . would create the correct economic incentives to cause 
holders of securities in low interest rate environments to lend 
securities again.”63
In its ensuing report to the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
TBAC expressed the view that the low level of short-term 
interest rates “has made the cost of failing negligible, [leaving] 
little desire for short-sellers to close out their positions” and 
noted the suggestion of one committee member “that there 
should be a cost in the form of a penalty rate associated with 
fails in a low-rate environment.” The report further noted that 
such a cost would encourage negative-rate repo trading, 
“which would allow the free market to determine the effective 
cost of the fail, and change the economics of securities 
lending.”64
63 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Treasury 
Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, November 4, 2008,” November 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1239.htm.
64 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Report to the Secretary of the Treasury 
from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association, November 4, 2008,” November 5, 2008, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1238.htm.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 65
8.2 Comments in Wrightson’s 
Money Market Observer
The January 5, 2009, edition of Wrightson’s Money Market 
Observer devoted substantial space to the TMPG proposal to 
revise the market convention for settlement fails. The 
newsletter noted that creating an explicit charge for settlement 
fails was “the most straight-forward way to remedy the obvious 
structural flaws that lead to delivery logjams in today’s 
market,” and pointed out the anticipated benefits of restoring 
competitive market forces to the special collateral repo 
markets: “The TMPG believes (correctly, in our view) that the 
repo market will be more elastic—and the Treasury clearing 
process more efficient—if the floor on special repo rates is set 
low enough [that is, below zero] to preserve a spread relative to 
general collateral rates even in the current rate environment.”
9. Getting  It  Right
Although a consensus had emerged in support of revising the 
market convention for settlement fails, the TMPG 
recommendation for reducing invoice prices itself needed 
some revision. 
The TMPG recommendation would have required a seller 
and a buyer to reduce the invoice price on a failing transaction 
by matching amounts on a daily basis. If one party reduced the 
invoice price and the other did not, or if the two parties 
reduced the invoice price by different amounts, any attempt by 
the seller to deliver securities against payment would be 
rejected by the buyer (because the buyer would be looking to 
pay a different amount than what the seller was looking to 
receive). TMPG members who understood the complex 
architecture of broker-dealer and custodian settlement systems 
pointed out that requiring matching daily price reductions 
would impose a major operational burden on market 
participants and could lead to an explosion in rejected 
deliveries (and thus in settlement fails).
In lieu of adjusting invoice prices, several TMPG members 
suggested that an economically equivalent result could be 
obtained if a seller who makes a late delivery agrees to make a 
side payment to the buyer in an amount equal to what became 
known as the “TMPG fails charge.” The charge for a fail on a 
given business day would be computed as:
(1)                  .01 ,
where:
             charge, in dollars,
              number of calendar days to the next following
                      business day,
         target federal funds rate at the close of business
                      on the business day preceding the fail, in percent
                      per annum, and
              total proceeds due from the buyer, in dollars.
For example, if   = $10 million,   = 1 percent, and   = 
three days, then   = $1,666.66.65 This procedure had the 
advantage of not requiring any change in existing settlement 
systems.
The idea of replacing invoice price adjustments with side 
payments illustrates an important aspect of the TMPG 
initiative: by working collaboratively, the TMPG was able to 
achieve its objectives while accommodating an existing 
institutional structure: back-office settlement systems. The 
difference between a price adjustment and a side payment may 
seem trivial, but the success of the TMPG initiative hinged on 
recognizing the difference.
9.1 The January 5 Announcement
On January 5, 2009, the TMPG announced that it was 
recommending a fails charge in the form of a side payment 
on transactions that failed to settle on a timely basis and 
that it was making several additional refinements to its 
November 12 recommendation.66 The three key refinements 
65 $1,666.66 = (3/360)  .01  max[3 1, 0]  $10,000,000.
66 Treasury Market Practices Group, “Timeline for New Market Practices to 
Address Widespread Settlement Fails in U.S. Treasury Securities,” January 5, 
2009, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/PR090105c.pdf, and 
Treasury Market Practices Group, “Claiming a Fails Charge for a Settlement 
Fail in U.S. Treasury Securities,” January 5, 2009, available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/PR090105a.pdf. The January 5 announcement 
was reported in “Repo Arena Gets a Plan on Penalties,” Wall Street Journal, 
January 6, 2009, p. C3, and “Penalty for Failed Trades Set to Spark New Era for 
US Repo,” Financial Times, January 7, 2009, p. 22.
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Although a consensus had emerged in 
support of revising the market convention 
for settlement fails, the TMPG 
recommendation for reducing invoice 
prices itself needed some revision.   66 The Introduction of the TMPG Fails Charge
were 1) a statement of the process for claiming a fails charge, 2) 
a timeline suggesting that market participants begin claiming 
for settlement fails on transactions agreed to on or after May 1, 
2009, and 3) replacement of the target federal funds rate (in the 
formula for the fails charge, equation 1 above) with a “TMPG 
reference rate.” The latter rate was defined as the target federal 
funds rate if the Federal Open Market Committee specified a 
target rate or the lower limit of the target band for the federal 
funds rate if the FOMC specified a target band.67 In the event 
the FOMC specified neither a target rate nor a target band, the 
TMPG committed to recommending some other similar, 
readily observable, short-term interest rate as a reference rate 
for the fails charge formula.68
The decision to recommend a side payment (in lieu of an 
invoice price adjustment) required the TMPG to specify a way 
for buyers to collect from sellers who failed to deliver securities 
on a timely basis. In the case of buyers and sellers who settled 
through FICC, a collection process could be added to other 
similar processes previously implemented by FICC (such as 
the collections and disbursements that result from marking 
transactions to current market prices).69 However, the 
collection process was not as simple for transactions that 
settled bilaterally, as was the case for most transactions between 
dealers and their nondealer customers.
67 This charge was necessitated by the December 16, 2008, decision of the 
Federal Open Market Committee to establish a target range for the federal 
funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent.
68 In late March 2009, the TMPG announced a slightly different form for the 
fails charge computation:
                              .01  .
In this form, the charge is computed for each calendar day that a seller’s 
delivery obligation is failing.   is the TMPG reference rate on the 
business day preceding the day for which the charge is computed. See Treasury 
Market Practices Group, “Treasury Market Practices Group Announces 
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The January 5 announcement suggested that the best way to 
initiate the fails charge would be for buyers to tender claims 
directly to sellers.70 A seller could either pay what was claimed 
or dispute the claim and negotiate with its counterparty over 
the amount due. 
The TMPG further suggested that if an investor employed a 
professional asset manager and that manager contracted to sell 
securities that were not delivered on a timely basis, the claim 
for the fails charge should be directed to the asset manager 
(rather than to the investor or to the investor’s custodian). This 
suggestion was based on the pragmatic notion that since the 
sale had been negotiated by the asset manager, the asset 
manager would be in the best position to recognize the sale and 
identify who was responsible for the settlement fail, be it the 
asset manager, the investor’s custodian, or some other party,71 
or whether the claim should be left for the account of the 
investor.72
9.2 Trading Practice and Market Practice
Recommendations
Following the January 5 announcement, TMPG members 
and other market participants collaborated to publish two 
documents providing guidance on how to implement the 
TMPG fails charge. The documents were important for 
clarifying how fails charges should be calculated and claimed 
and generally for enhancing the transparency of the new 
market convention.
69 The addition required a change in FICC rules that had to be approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. FICC filed the proposed rule change on 
February 25, 2009 (Securities and Exchange Commission Release no. 34-
59569, March 12, 2009), and the Commission granted approval two months 
later (Securities and Exchange Commission Release no. 34-59802, April 20, 
2009).
70 The January 5 announcement noted the possibility of setting up a central 
industry utility to receive and process claims, but observed that the design of 
such a facility raised novel questions regarding the identification of buyers and 
sellers and would require further consultation with market participants.
71 Some investors retain an agent to lend securities from the investor’s 
portfolio. Such agents are commonly called “agent sec lenders.” In most cases, 
an agent sec lender is obliged to reclaim securities out on loan if the investor’s 
asset manager decides to sell the securities. If an agent sec lender fails to reclaim 
securities on a timely basis and thereby causes a settlement fail, the fail may be 
the responsibility of the agent sec lender, rather than the asset manager or the 
custodian.
72 A sale of securities negotiated by an asset manager may fail to settle on a 
timely basis because the investor’s custodian failed to receive the same 
securities on an unrelated purchase. Such fails cannot be attributed to faulty 
behavior by the asset manager or the investor’s custodian, so the resulting fails 
charge would be left for the account of the investor. The investor can, of course, 
direct its asset manager to file a claim on the seller who failed to deliver 
securities to the investor.
On January 5, 2009, the TMPG announced 
that it was recommending a fails charge in 
the form of a side payment on transactions 
that failed to settle on a timely basis and 
that it was making several additional 
refinements to its November 12 
recommendation.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 67
Trading practice recommendations: On January 15, 2009, the 
TMPG and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) published a “U.S. Treasury Securities 
Fails Charge Trading Practice”73 to give market participants 
guidance on exactly the types of transactions that were covered 
by, and excluded from, the TMPG fails charge. The “Trading 
Practice” also recommended the form of a letter that a market 
participant could send to counterparties, advising them of the 
participant’s adoption of the new policy for settlement fails, 
and suggested a statement that could be added to trade 
confirmations indicating that a transaction was subject to the 
fails charge.
Market practice recommendations: On April 23, 2009, SIFMA 
published a “Treasury Market Practices Group Fails Charge 
Market Practice”74 that recommended procedures for buy-side 
firms to use in connection with the new fails charge. The 
recommended procedures included processes for researching 
and tracking fails, calculating fails charges, determining 
responsibility for a claim, sending and receiving claims, and 
accounting for claims. The procedures also included 
suggestions made earlier by SIFMA and adopted by the 
TMPG75 that claims be submitted at the beginning of a month 
for fails settled during the preceding month (to accommodate 
custodians and asset managers who structured their control 
73 Treasury Market Practices Group and Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, “U.S. Treasury Securities Fails Charge Trading Practice,” 
January 15, 2009, available at http://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/docs/
Fails-Charge-Trading-Practice.pdf.
74 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, “Treasury Market 
Practices Group Fails Charge Market Practice,” April 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.theasset manager.com/docs/AM_Custodian_IndustryProcedures_ 
TMPG_FailsCharge.pdf.
75 See Treasury Market Practices Group, “Treasury Market Practices Group 
Announces Updates to Fails Charge Recommendation,” March 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/tmpg_033009.pdf.
systems around settled transactions) and be in excess of $500 
per issue per settlement (to limit costly research and billing 
efforts to nontrivial claims).
10. Implementation
The TMPG fails charge went into effect on May 1, 2009, 
replacing the former market convention of postponing—
without any explicit penalty and at an unchanged invoice 
price—a seller’s obligation to deliver Treasury securities when 
the seller fails to deliver the securities on a scheduled settlement 
date. Henceforth, the cost of failing to settle a sale of Treasury 
securities in a timely fashion would not be less than 3 percent 
per annum.
It would be premature to argue that the TMPG fails charge 
has eliminated the possibility of yet another episode of chronic 
settlement fails in Treasury securities; past episodes were rare 
to begin with and some future event may demonstrate the 
existence of an unsuspected flaw in the new system. It may also 
be the case that the 3 percent benchmark rate is too low and 
that chronic fails would be better mitigated with a 3 1/2 or 
4 percent rate. However, there is no evidence to date that the 
new market convention, and the 3 percent benchmark rate, are 
not working. Chart 6 shows daily average settlement fails over 
weekly intervals from the beginning of 2009 to July 2010. Fails 
averaged a bit over $14.4 billion per day during the first four 
months of 2009, but only $4.2 billion per day since 
implementation of the fails charge.76 More important, the 
relatively modest eruptions of settlement fails that appeared 
during the first week of July 2009 and the first week of January 
2010 quickly subsided. The new convention is not yet out of its 
infancy, but there is reason to anticipate that the TMPG fails 
charge will similarly dampen future eruptions.
76 The fails charge was never intended to eliminate all settlement fails. (Fails 
attributable to miscommunication or operational problems are unlikely to be 
eliminated by the fails charge—although they may be resolved more quickly.) 
Rather, the fails charge was aimed at mitigating episodes of chronic fails that 
can threaten market liquidity and efficiency.
TMPG members and other market 
participants collaborated to publish two 
documents providing guidance on how to 
implement the TMPG fails charge. The 
documents were important for clarifying 
how fails charges should be calculated 
and claimed and generally for enhancing 
the transparency of the new market 
convention.
The new convention is not yet out of its 
infancy, but there is reason to anticipate 
that the TMPG fails charge will . . . dampen 






























































































































































































































































































































































Daily Average (Over Weekly Intervals) Primary Dealer Settlement Fails in Treasury Securities
January 2009 to July 2010
Billions of dollars
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
After May 1, 2009 Prior to May 1, 2009
2009 2010
11. Conclusion
The TMPG fails charge initiative is important both for what it 
accomplished and for how it was accomplished. Substantively, 
the initiative revised an outmoded convention and mitigated 
an important dysfunctionality in a market of critical national 
significance. Procedurally, the initiative demonstrated how 
cooperation between the public and private sectors can speed 
innovative and efficient responses to changing circumstances. 
At the time of the May 1, 2009, implementation of the fails 
charge, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York welcomed the 
new convention:
We applaud the dedicated efforts of the TMPG in 
spearheading the development and implementation of 
this targeted solution to the settlement fails problem. This 
significant milestone in the evolution of Treasury market 
practice demonstrates that groups, such as the TMPG, are 
effective in addressing deficiencies in market functioning 
and facilitating market best practices.77
In a subsequent letter to the TMPG membership expressing his 
personal thanks for the Group’s dedication and commitment 
to making the fails charge a reality, William Dudley, now 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, reflected 
on the significance of the new market convention:
The implementation of the fails charge marks a rare and 
significant evolution in Treasury market architecture. In 
my view, one would need to look back to 1982 to find a 
development of similar magnitude, when the collapse of 
Drysdale Securities led to the adoption of a new market 
practice to include accrued interest in repo contracts. 
The fails charge stands among relatively few revisions 
to contracting conventions in the Treasury market since 
the development of a liquid national market following 
World War I. 
77 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “New York Fed Applauds 
Implementation of the TMPG’s Fails Charge Recommendation,” May 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/
ma090501.html.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2010 69
The following list attempts to include all non-TMPG (Treasury Market Practices Group) 
individuals who either served on formal subgroups that contributed to the timely implementation 
of the TMPG fails charge or participated in less formal conference calls and meetings. The authors 
apologize for any inadvertent omissions.
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